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Memorandum for the Deputy Minister.
With the advent of a Minister who is not 
conversant with Naval matters, nor with 
the requirements of the Naval Service, it 
appears desirable to supply information 
on these points; I therefore forward 
herewith a few remarks which will tend 
to enlighten him with regard to immediate 
requirements with a view to discussion at 
an early date on the points raised.
[signed] C.E. Kingsmill
Rear Admiral.
Director of the Naval Service.
Ottawa, October 9th, 1911.
I. Ship Construction
The programme of a new construction 
adopted by the late Government consists 
of :-
4 Cruisers of the improved “Bristol” type.
6 improved “River Class” Destroyers.
Whilst this programme does not appear 
an ambitious one, yet it meets present 
Admiral Kingsmill and the Early 
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Following are the second and third documents in a series assembled to support the creation of a plaque 
in honour of Admiral Kingsmill by the Ontario Heritage Trust. The plaque is located at his burial place, 
Emmanuel Anglican Church Cemetery, Portland Ontario, near the location of Kingsmill’s summer home 
on Grindstone Island, and was unveiled in a ceremony on 15 May 2010. 
Document 2
Kingsmill’s recommendations for 
development of the Canadian Navy, 1911
Director of the Naval Service, “Memorandum for the Deputy 
Minister,” 9 October 1911 (National Defence Headquarters, 
Directorate of History and Heritage, G.J. Desbarats papers, folder “A”)
Editor’s note: This is Kingsmill’s professional advice to the new Conservative 
government that came to power after the defeat of the Laurier government in the 
federal election of September 1911. It shows in detail his vision for the new navy 
eighteen months after the proclamation of the Naval Service Act on 4 May 1910. The 
development of the service had in fact been almost completely stalled since late 1910 
when the Laurier government began to hesitate in the face of opposition, especially 
among French Canadians in Quebec, the Liberal party’s power base. One can sense 
Kingsmill’s impatience, especially in his recommendation that the training program 
should be expanded and accelerated by acquiring the obsolescent battleship HMS 
Empress of India as an additional training platform. She was one of the “Royal 
Sovereign” class built as a result of the Naval Defence Act of 1889 that had mandated 
expansion and modernization of the British fleet to compete with the growing naval 
strength of France and Russia, then the most likely enemies of the Empire. Kingsmill’s 
emphasis on training facilities, like the detailed recommendations for the improvement 
of base facilities, show a professional’s determination that the new service should have 
the infrastructure necessary to sustain effective ongoing operations and as a foundation 
for future development. Also note his warning that naval technology was changing so 
rapidly that the warship designs being considered for the new fleet should be updated. 
 The fate of Kingsmill’s recommendations was anticipated by a short handwritten 
minute dated 28 October 1911 by the deputy minister, G. J. Desbarats, on the 
first page, “Submitted as a recital of facts, and without endorsing the incidental 
recommendations.” A seasoned bureaucrat attuned to the direction of political winds, 
Desbarats well understood the Conservatives’ opposition to the Laurier naval project. 
He was not about to immerse himself or the department in political controversy by 
endorsing the naval staff’s professional advice. Desbarats was right to be cautious. 
The new government soon slashed the 
naval budget in half, to $1,660,000, and 
called a halt to all development while they 
considered means by which the Laurier 
program could be replaced by one for a 
more modest and less controversial force.
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requirements from the fact that Ships 
of this type do not require very large 
complements, and we are in a position 
to train sufficient men to form part of their 
crew, and will not require to obtain the 
loan of such large numbers of officers 
and men from the Imperial Government 
as would be necessary if large Armoured 
Cruisers were included in the programme. 
The Admiralty find difficulty in keeping 
their ships fully manned, and are thus not 
in a position to spare large numbers for 
the Dominion Navies.
 Tenders were called for and have 
been received by the Government for the 
construction of these vessels in Canada; 
whilst it may be desirable to encourage 
a Firm or Firms to establish Shipyards in 
Canada, the interest and efficiency of the 
Naval Service would be better served if 
some portion of the Ships, one or two of 
the Cruisers, and two Destroyers, were 
constructed in England, orders being 
placed without delay. We should thus be 
able to obtain delivery of one Destroyer 
within a year and one Cruiser and a 
second Destroyer within 18 months; by 
that time a sufficient number of men will 
have been trained to form the nucleus 
of the crews and training will be more 
efficiently and expeditiously carried 
out with the advent of modern Ships. 
In the mean time a Shipyard can be 
established in Canada and the remainder 
of the ships constructed in this Yard; the 
whole of the Programme would thus be 
completed in four years instead of in six 
years as at present arranged. Owing to 
the rapidity with which designs change it 
is anticipated that, if it takes six years to 
complete the programme, the Ships will 
be out of date before they are completed.
 Even in the short period which 
has elapsed since the present designs 
were adopted, the typical destroyers 
have increased in displacement and the 
machinery arrangement has been re-
designed, which may make it desirable 
to negotiate with the firm who undertakes 
the work for an improved destroyer.
II. Personnel.
MINIMUM TIME NECESSARY FOR THE 
TRAINING OF SEAMEN.
Boy in training ship .................... 2 years
Able Seaman ............................. 2 years
Seaman Gunner or Torpedo Man ......1 year
Gunlayer ......................................1 year
 Total  ................................... 6 years
Stoker, 2nd Class, in training ship .....1 year
Stoker, 1st Class ........................ 2 years
 Total .................................... 3 years
 Owing to the length of time which 
it takes to train a Seaman (as above), 
it is necessary that recruiting should 
be proceeded with as expeditiously as 
possible. At present recruits are trained 
in “NIOBE” and “RAINBOW”, Cruisers 
purchased from the Imperial Government 
for that purpose; the accommodations, 
however, in those Ships is limited, there 
being only room for approximately 250 
recruits; it is therefore urgent to make 
arrangements for further accommodation, 
and this can be done either by building 
permanent Barracks on shore, or by 
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having a permanent f loat ing 
barracks; owing to the time which 
must elapse to complete a building 
ashore, it is advisable to adopt 
the latter plan, and the Admiralty 
are willing to provide, at breaking 
up price (about $160,000) the 
“Empress of India”, an obsolete 
battleship of 14,150 tons; this Ship 
would require an expenditure of 
about $80,000 to fit her for service 
for which she is required. This 
ship would have a life of 20 years 
at least, and, at the end of that 
period, her value for breaking up 
purposes would not have materially 
depreciated. 
 The  p resen t  sys tem o f 
recruiting, under which Postmasters 
act as Recruiting Officers, was only 
intended as a temporary measure, 
and, whilst it is proposed to continue 
the system, it is necessary to 
supplement it by appointing proper 
Recruiting Officers. The number of 
desertions from the Ships tends to 
show that we are not obtaining the 
class of men we require; mostly 
they are recruited from the Towns, 
have no knowledge of the life they 
are undertaking, and, not finding it to 
their liking, they desert. With proper 
Recruiting Officers visiting the towns 
and villages around the sea coasts, it is 
anticipated that we shall obtain recruits 
from the fishing population, men and 
boys accustomed to a seafaring life. The 
Recruiting Officers should be supplied 
with lantern and slides depicting life in the 
Navy; an entertainment of this kind would 
materially assist in recruiting.
 It would also be advantageous if 
arrangements were made to acquire the 
use of West’s “Our Navy” films, which 
could be hired out to the Proprietors of 
Cinematograph entertainments in various 
Towns to educate the lay mind in Naval 
matters.
 It is essential that the Pension 
scheme shall be decided without delay 
in order that the full advantages of the 
Naval Service may be made known. 
Proposed schemes have been prepared 
and submitted for consideration.
 The rates of pay provided do not 
compare favourably with shore rates, 
and, although this does not affect the 
younger men who are provided with 
food, clothing and lodging and who 
have no outside expenses, there is not 
doubt that complaints will arise as they 
arrive at marriageable age and find that 
their pay does not admit of matrimony; 
many complaints have already been 
received with respect to this from the 
Pensioners and Fleet Reserve men who 
were recruited in England. To increase 
the pay all round, and bring it up to 
the shore rates, is out of the question, 
and it is proposed therefore to institute 
a “married allowance” to be provided 
under regulations to a fixed proportion 
of the various ratings; this will place the 
Naval Service on the same footing as the 
Permanent Militia. A proposed scheme 
has been prepared and submitted for 
consideration.
 With the acquisition of a permanent 
Training Establishment and a Training 
Cruiser, the establishment of a 
Naval Reserve must be seriously 
considered. It is not proposed to 
establish a large reserve, and there 
should be no difficulty in enrolling 
sufficient men who have seafaring 
experience, and who would be 
glad to undertake training in the 
winter months. Regulations for 
a Naval Reserve have already 




 Whilst the present College 
i s  su f f i c i en t  f o r  immed ia te 
requirements, it is essential to 
look to the future, when it is at 
once apparent that the present 
accommodation will be be quite 
insufficient to meet requirements 
in a very few years.
 T h e  c o u r s e  o f  t r a i n i n g 
necessitates that a certain number 
of Officers shall return to College 
after serving a certain time at sea, 
and it is necessary at once to 
think of providing the necessary 
accommodation.
 The present  Co l lege  cannot 
possibility accommodate more than 45 
cadets, and this is the number fixed for 
the requirements of the Naval Service; 
it would, however, be advantageous 
if a larger number of Cadets could be 
entered, in order that the best might be 
selected for the Naval Service and thus 
keep a higher standard; as it becomes 
more widely known what an excellent 
education is obtainable at the College, it 
is anticipated that there will be no lack of 
candidates. An institution such as R.M.C. 
Kingston, only on Naval lines, would be 
of great value to the country.
 It is, however, necessary to introduce 
an allowance for Travelling expenses of 
the Cadets since the high cost of travelling 
practically eliminates candidates from 
the West and Central Provinces; the 
arrangements proposed have already 
been submitted for consideration.
George J. Desbarats
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 It will be seen from the foregoing 
that it is necessary to at once consider 
the question of the construction of a 
new College Building, surrounded by 
recreation grounds and the necessary 
buildings and workshops, incidental to the 
course of training which is carried out. 
III. DRILL SHED & TRAINING 
BATTERY
 These are required in connection with 
the training of recruits; a certain portion 
of Gunnery Training can be carried out 
in the Training Establishments, but it is 
necessary to provide these buildings on 
shore at an early date.
 The question of the gun battery 
requires very early consideration. 
Recruits are, at present, being trained 
with obsolescent guns, which in the early 
stages of training is immaterial.
 Two years from the present time 
however, it will be necessary for these 
recruits to commence more advanced 
training with guns and appliances similar 
to those they will find in the ships about 
to be built. 
 The necessary guns and mountings 
will have to be manufactured in England 
and the absolute minimum time for 
this is 12 months, their dispatch to 
Canada and erection would entail a 
further 6 months. 
 Consequently a decision as to 
the locality for its erection should 
not be now long deferred.
 A drill shed is also a necessity so 
that in cold and wet weather training 
can be carried on uninterruptedly.
IV. DOCKYARDS
 In anticipation of some of the 
vessels of the Naval Programme 
being completed in three years, 
the necessary Dockyard provision 
must be made for dealing with any 
repairs which may arise when the 
ships come into service.
 The plant and machinery at 
Halifax is unsuitable and inadequate 
to deal with repairs to up-to-date 
ships; complete re-organisation is 
necessary and new shops and machinery 
are required.
 The additions which will be necessary 
raise the question as to whether the 
existing dockyard is suitable to meet the 
future requirements and whether there is 
room for expansion to deal with a modern 
fleet.
 The suitability of the present site 
of the Dockyard at Halifax requires, 
therefore, immediate consideration, and 
it is not desirable to incur more expense 
than necessary on the present Dockyard 
until this question has been considered. 
The present site leaves no room for 
expansion and also blocks any expansion 
in the shape of facilities for mercantile 
Ships and Railways.  
 The Admiralty have been approached 
in th is matter  and concur in the 
abandonment of the present Dockyard, 
provided that similar accommodation is 
provided elsewhere in Halifax; a suitable 
situation is available and a report thereon 
has been made.
 In the event of it being decided 
to remain in present position, a report 
was drawn up and forwarded to the 
Deputy Minister in April last giving 
detailed proposals for re-organization of 
Halifax, the estimated cost of which was 
approximately, $1,300,000.
 Esquimalt Dockyard with a few 
additions meets present requirements.






Director of the Naval Service to 
the Deputy Minister, 4 April 1911, 
enclosing Director of Naval Gunnery 
to Director of the Naval Service, 31 
March 1911 (Library and Archives 
Canada, National Personnel Records 
Centre, file NS 60-S-2)
Editor’s note: A striking aspect 
of Kingsmill’s recommendations of 
October 1911 for the development of 
the navy, reproduced above, is that 
he, the professional head of the naval 
service, passed this professional advice 
to the minister through the deputy 
minister, a civil servant. G.J. 
Desbarats, the deputy minister, had 
in fact exerted considerable effort to 
establish himself in this position. 
Citing his financial responsibilities 
in the new department, he first 
won an increment in salary that 
gave him a higher pay scale than 
Kingsmill. On that basis he then 
successfully claimed precedence 
over the admiral in the organization.
 The documents reproduced 
below give evidence of Kingsmill’s 
irritation at the predominance 
of a civil servant in a military 
department. The second document 
below is a threat of resignation by 
Lieutenant R.M.T. Stephens, one 
of three British officers engaged by 
Kingsmill in 1909 as headquarters 
staff to assist in the military 
direction of the service. In reality, 
Royal Naval College Halifax
LAC PA 028503
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Stephens, as he complains, was employed 
as a clerk by the deputy minister for 
routine civil service duties. Kingsmill, 
in forwarding Stephens’s note, not 
only endorses it but adds that he too is 
employed by Desbarats for clerical work. 
Memo. For Deputy Minister:
In  forward ing the accompanying 
correspondence f rom L ieutenant 
Stephens, I would like to add that I think 
it is very desirable that some definite 
arrangements should be arrived at as to 
the duties and position of Mr. Stephens.
 Mr. Stephens’ duties are, in my 
opinion, exceedingly important. He has 
all to do with the Gunnery and Torpedo 
work of the different vessels, which, 
although up to the present they have not 
carried out any very extensi[v]e practice, 
involved the responsibility of precautions 
to be taken and regulations to be attended 
to. In addition to the above, he is the 
Intelligence Officer of the Department, 
which entails quite a considerable amount 
of work.
 I must say that I agree with him as 
to the question raised as to answering 
Parliamentary questions and making out 
returns. Mr. Stephens’ duties, as far as 
the Gunnery and Torpedo work goes, 
necessitate a great deal of detail work, 
which it is next door to impossible to 
satisfactorily look after if he is interrupted 
from time to time.
 In my opinion, the Department is 
suffering very much through the Deputy 
Minister not having some one Clerk 
immediately under him who can attend 
to all these extraneous matters. As far 
as my own work goes, I find that looking 
up files as, for instance, in the case 
of the B.C. Salvage Company’s claim 
against the Department, and another 
case cropping up with Mr. Wright, and 
all such matters might b e done by Civil 
Departmental Official as well as by 
myself. I think in organizing a Service like 
this that I requires one’s whole attention 
in considering matters and looking 
ahead, and not to have one’s time so 
fully occupied writing letters for different 
persons’ signatures, and obtaining 
information asked for in the Senate and 
House which is all on file.
April 4, ’11    
[Signed] C.E. Kingsmill Rear Admiral.
* * * * *
Ottawa 31 March 1911
CONFIDENTIAL
Sir, 
 I have the honour to make the 
following further remarks with reference to 
the correspondence between the Deputy 
Minister and myself, submitted to you on 
the 27th. instant.
 I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  f r o m  t h e 
Correspondence that there appears to 
be some difference of opinion between us 
as to the position and duties of the D.N.G.
 I therefore submit that the Deputy 
Minister may be requested to express his 
views as to the position and duties of the 
D.N.G., in order that I may be free to take 
any further steps which I may consider 
necessary,
 I am, Sir, 
 Your Obedient Servant,
 R.M. Stephens
 Lieutenant R.N.,
 Directory of Naval Gunnery
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